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REMEMBERING JUDGE MERHIGE
Michael W. Smith, Esq. *
When first approached about writing this article, the instructions were to write something "on the Judge," not to exceed five to
ten pages. Synthesizing anything about the Judge in five to ten
pages is questionable, adding only to the fear of not saying all
that should be said, or saying it in the wrong way. Most of us who
knew him have preferred just to remember him, adding our own
stories to the banter which always seems to get around eventually to him.
A comprehensive biography was not necessary inasmuch as the
highlights of his career have been recounted in numerous articles
before and after his death. A native of New York, he came south
to High Point College in North Carolina to play basketball.
Thinking he would give law school a try, he was directed to
Richmond, having been told that William and Mary was located
there. Discovering his error but with no money in his pocket for
the trip to Williamsburg, the Judge sought admission to and was
admitted as a student at the University of Richmond's T.C. Williams School of Law. During law school, the family of a classmate
put him up in a small apartment above their garage, and he financed his way with odd jobs, including coaching the St. Christopher's High School football team. Following an exemplary law
school career, and service as a member of an Army Air Corps
bombing group in Europe during World War II, he settled in to a
law practice in Richmond.
Moreover, any in-depth recitation of landmark decisions as the
focal point of this article seemed superfluous. Many accounts in
various forms are readily available about the cases that influenced our lives and shaped our jurisprudence. The H. Rap Brown
First Amendment case in 1967 and the Dalkon Shield cases (and
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subsequent A.H. Robins Bankruptcy) near the end of his judicial
term serve as bookends for a variety of civil and criminal cases
interspersed with such haymakers as the school and prison desegregation cases, the Wounded Knee protest case, the Kepone
Environmental case, the Westinghouse Uranium case, the integration of women into the student body at the University of Virginia, and the case in Greensboro, North Carolina which pitted
the Communist Workers Party against the Klu Klux Klan and
American Nazis, among the many others.
It was my good fortune to have served as one of the Judge's law
clerks, practiced in his court for roughly thirty years, and gathered stories from others recounting some of the traits and characteristics that combined to make him a great jurist. Fortunately,
there are others who knew him well-at least as well as I-who
over time will share other stories and remembrances, and
broaden the legend. While one could reasonably advance several
arguments to account for his legacy, for my part, it was a confluence of certain personal characteristics and job requirements that
made him unique to the bench, and exemplary in the manner in
which he dispensed justice.
Overarching this combination of traits were two distinct characteristics. First, Judge Merhige loved the law. He was unafraid
to say it, and he loved everything about it-including his job and
the people involved in the job's administration. He looked forward
to each day on the bench and used to joke that his "last real job
was delivering ice to yachts on Long Island" as a teenager. Second, Judge Merhige genuinely liked people, but a "people person"
is an inadequate description. Lawyers, law clerks, court staff, and
the like, all integral to his life on the bench and participants in
the success of the system, formed concentric circles of family. As a
result, lawyers never sought to avoid his court, but rather sought
it out. Whether winning or losing, no lawyer had to worry about
being embarrassed or treated unfairly. None had to fear tirades,
snap judgments, or hidden agendas. It was important to him that
all litigants, especially the losers, walked away with a sense of
having received their fair day in court, a requirement the Judge
explained as a solemn duty of every judge.
One of the best examples of his compassion for people was his
sensitive management of the Dalkon Shield / A.H. Robins bankruptcy litigation. There can be no doubt that Judge Merhige felt
deeply about the plight of each injured woman and demanded fair
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treatment of each. While he made absolutely sure that each was
fully compensated for her injuries, the Judge was not unmindful
of the A.H. Robins employees who stood to lose their jobs should
the company disappear. Nor was he blind to the plight of the Robins family who saw a fine, successful, and distinguished family
business impaired. Through the eventual sale of the business to
American Home Products, all of these interests were addressed to
every extent possible under the circumstances.
The prominent cases and other examples of how he managed
his court were not the only aspects of his life that helped shape
and define the personality so integral to his judicial career. His
upbringing no doubt had something to do with his self-effacing
nature, humility and humor, dispelling any notion that he
thought it necessary to run away from his beginnings, masquerade as something he was not or change his skin. He found a way
to humanize himself, especially when he put on a black robe. He
always put those in his courtroom at ease, enabling them to focus
attention on what was important to the fair resolution of a dispute.
The Judge was quick to require strict adherence to and respect
for the institution of the Court. At the same time, he drew a
sharp distinction between respect required for the Court and
what was owed to the person sitting as judge. He once said: "Respect for the Court does not mean that you need to think that I
am very bright-my wife doesn't; you need not like mesometimes my wife doesn't; and you need not be afraid to say somy wife isn't." To him, it was the institution, the system, not the
person sitting in the judge's chair, that had to be respected. Understanding the difference was a key to affording the necessary
protection to the system.
The Judge's signature sense of humor crept in at every turn,
reinforcing that wonderful self-effacing nature of his. Years ago, a
young lawyer from Richmond was making his pitch one afternoon, but going nowhere with it. Rather than cut him off, belittle
him, or shatter his confidence, the Judge remarked: "I know you
think that I am missing your point, but for $54,000 a year, you
don't get John Marshall."
While not the only factor in his development as a judge, the
constant barrage of big cases did help define him. It took resilience to handle a caseload laced with emotionally draining deci-
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sions. In fact, the Judge told many a young lawyer, including this
one years ago, that while confidence, hard work, good sense,
judgment, and fair play are necessary ingredients for any trial
lawyer, "resilience is the glue that holds it all together." In other
words, one has to be able to pour his heart and soul into a case,
only to suffer the inevitable emotional and consequential ups and
downs, and still show up the next day and pick up the next file.
Experienced trial lawyers knew exactly what he meant and, in
the Judge's view, the trait was necessary for judges as well.
There really was no surprise about the relationship which developed between the Judge and those who worked and practiced
in his court. He had been an extraordinary lawyer, and a wellrespected, close friend of his peers. As M. Wallace Moncure, a
civil trial lawyer one generation senior to the Judge and universally considered one of the best, said, "He was born to be a lawyer
until it was time for him to become a judge."
From the day in August, 1967, that Robert R. Merhige, Jr. was
sworn in as Judge of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, friends and family referred to him
only as the Judge. At the swearing in ceremony in Richmond, law
partner, mentor, and best friend, Leith S. Bremner, addressed the
group assembled in what was to become Judge Merhige's courtroom on the third floor of what is now the Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
U.S. Courthouse. Mr. Bremner spoke on behalf of the Bar Association of the City of Richmond, of which both he and Judge Merhige had served as President. Mr. Bremner's practice, like Judge
Merhige's, was principally criminal. The Judge always said that
Mr. Bremner was hands down the best. Mr. Bremner also had a
reputation (which he denied) for seeking and obtaining continuances of cases in the hopes that memories of witnesses would
fade, all to the advantage of his clients. Calling on that reputation, Mr. Bremner addressed the Court of the soon to be sworn in
Robert Merhige, "I trust the Court would indulge those of us here
today and see fit to grant a continuance of these proceedings." Mr.
Bremner spoke that day for all in attendance, especially the lawyers, and echoed everyone's feelings of friendship and admiration
for the Judge. While those in attendance strongly supported
Robert Merhige's wish to become a judge, they would have been
happy to see things stay just the way they were.
The Judge engendered such respect among the bar in large part
because he showed respect for the bar in the first instance. This
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mutual admiration had a positive effect on how lawyers conducted themselves and handled their cases in his court. Nobody
wanted to leave his courtroom thinking that the Judge thought
less of him, his preparation, or his ability. Hence, cases were better prepared, professionalism and civility were insured, cases
moved along and the interests of the litigants, not to mention the
administration of justice, were best served. A lawyer from another state in a hotly contested antitrust case made the comment
to me that "win or lose, I don't want the Judge to think our lawyers are any less than what he expects or is accustomed to." That
lawyer, by the way, like most, stayed in contact with the Judge
from the trial of that case up to the Judge's death some thirty
years later.
One trick of his trade needs mentioning here. As alluded to earlier, the Judge ran a thoroughly efficient courtroom with the utmost regard for jurors and empathy for litigants. In jury cases, he
often mentioned to his law clerks that he "and the jury would be
best of friends in 10 minutes, and I am sure that we will have no
worry of being picked on by the lawyers." He did what he set out
to do, with that twinkle in his eye and quick wit, and any lawyer
paying attention knew that giving the Judge a problem meant a
problem for the lawyer with the jury.
On occasion, Judge Merhige would involve himself in settlement efforts, using his natural mediation instincts to help resolve
the cases. The practice is shunned by some judges and avoided by
others outright. There are legitimate arguments both ways.
Judge Merhige displayed the judgment and exhibited the uncanny talent to identify those cases the court should push toward
settlement. He remained constrained to the extent of never overusing or abusing the power of the robe or allowing himself to become compromised by the settlement process, recognizing that a
case might ultimately have to be tried. He was second to none in
walking this tightrope.
He thought that many civil cases, particularly commercial
ones, fit the settlement category. In the Judge's view, business
people were in a far better position to assess the various risks and
rewards than were judges and juries in commercial cases, and
were certainly better equipped to craft business solutions to resolve business problems.
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Once the Judge embarked on settlement, his means and methods were unique and even became the subjects of legal lore. One
example of the Judge at his best was the Westinghouse Uranium
case. It seemed simply unsolvable from the standpoint that it was
a "bet the company" case-the utilities had to have the uranium
to provide the power, and Westinghouse, if made to honor its contract with the utilities at the contract price for which it had
agreed to provide uranium, was out of business. Emotions ran
high and collateral considerations mitigating against settlement,
including uncontrollable foreign interests, were considerable. The
various Utility Regulatory Commissions also were an impediment
to settlement. They informed the utility parties which they regulated that if approval was sought to pass along increases to ratepayers for the cost of uranium, such increases would have to be
triggered by an adverse judgment, not a settlement. The easy way
out, of course, would have been for the Judge simply to try the
case, let the cards fall, close his file, and move on. His judgment
was to the contrary and driven by a desire to see the interests
best served of those who found themselves before his court.
The Judge knew that to forge a settlement, both parties had to
be at risk, and they had to trust each other to the extent that an
honest and good faith negotiation could take place. Additionally,
he concluded that he needed an acceptable Special Master to
work with the parties in the ongoing mediation process. As to
putting both sides at risk, the Judge bifurcated the liability case
from damages and held that Westinghouse's principal defense,
commercial impracticability, was to no avail. Thereafter, however, he told the utilities that he had grave doubts as to their
damage claims. To build the trust factor, he had the lawyers for
the parties and their clients meet and spend time together socially. Intuitively understanding that a venue for socializing was
important to the process, the group was entertained by Mrs.
Merhige and the Judge at their home. With a stroke of genius,
the Judge appointed the Honorable William B. Spong, Jr., a
highly respected former United States Senator from Virginia and
the then Dean of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary, as Special Master. Not only was the case resolved, but years later and within months of his death, there was
a Westinghouse reunion, hosted by and at the home of Mrs. Merhige and the Judge.
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There were, however, those cases that could not be settled, and
fortuities of time and geography dropped some of them right in
the Judge's lap. The public school desegregation cases were just
such cases, super-charged with public outrage not only by the underlying issues, but more so by the remedies that had to be forged
to correct the wrongs. Dealing with these cases took not only
great acumen, but an overdose of courage as well.
How he decided and what he did is public record. One has but
to look at some of the atmospheric elements in which those decisions were made to appreciate truly what a courageous judge he
was: late 1960s to mid-1970s timeframe; integration of the public
school system; busing as the remedy to achieve integration; local
media and populace vitriolic in their opposition and criticism; localities in or around the Judge's hometown being affected; his
guesthouse set on fire; the family dog shot; threats against the
Judge's life and those of his wife and children; having to place a
coin on the hood of his car in the mornings to make sure in the afternoon that it had not been tampered with; the U.S. Marshal
Service in and around his home constantly; hate mail and telephone calls; and the list goes on.
It would be difficult to assess one of the Judge's personality
traits as predominant, but courage would be right at the top of
the list.
Considering the pressures during the early desegregation days,
the patience he displayed was remarkable. There was a series of
cases which focused on the desegregation of jails. One case involved a jail not far from Richmond. The Sheriff refused to comply, and the court issued a show cause order for contempt of
court. The Sheriff appeared with his counsel, who happened to be
the local Commonwealth's Attorney and an old friend and acquaintance of the Judge, and the Sheriff stated in his defense
that "no damn federal judge will tell me how to run my jail." This
event happened during my clerkship, and I anticipated an explosion, having figured out by that time that the Judge was no
shrinking violet.
The anticipated explosion did not occur. After a long pause, the
Judge dispatched me to recess the court for 15 minutes, and he
requested counsel to see him in chambers. The Judge, calmly,
suggested to defense counsel that now that his client had cleared
his chest, perhaps he should consider the problems he faced, not
the least of which was jail time with his own prisoners. Shortly
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thereafter the Sheriff reappeared, apologized, promised to comply
with the court order, and the show cause proceeding was dismissed by the Judge.
Judge Merhige was consistent and balanced. Lawyers knew
where he stood and also where they stood with him. Even with
his longevity on the bench, praise from others, and awards too
numerous to count, he never considered himself to be omnipotent.
He knew it was important to be a listener, one who truly believed
that the lawyers knew more about their cases than he. Practicing
what he preached allowed him to be in a position to learn more,
or understand better and be, as he put it, "unpersuaded." Surely
his long and active practice as a lawyer developed a keen sense of
what lawyers expected, or at least hoped for, from a judge, and he
felt it his duty to be responsive.
Judge Merhige was also buoyed by a strong confidence in the
system, figuring that if he just did his job, "the best system developed by mankind so far" would work. He always thought of himself as nothing more than a public servant, there to call balls and
strikes, and knowing that, try as he might, he could be wrong. He
took comfort in a system that "would not allow a litigant to be penalized by my mistakes." For this reason, he never viewed the
appellate courts as adversaries or there to cause headaches for
the trial bench. While he may not have always agreed with appellate decisions, he understood that it was not the job of the courts
to always agree with him, and he never let it become personal. He
openly and often encouraged lawyers and litigants to test his decisions and to correct his mistakes by appealing his cases. The
few times his decisions were reversed, the Judge was encouraged
that the system had worked and that justice had been done.
This view of the system enabled him to approach cases and
their resolution with intellectual honesty, another significant trait
of his. What more can we ask of our judges?
Much has been made over the years about the Eastern District
of Virginia's so-called "rocket docket," some comments pro and
some con. This is not the place for that debate, but with Judge
Merhige, the debate was irrelevant. He never asked any lawyer to
do more than he himself did. I am proof positive from my year as
a law clerk and my years in practice thereafter that no lawyer
came to work earlier or left later. Also, there was something else
about him in this context that stemmed any rocket docket abuse
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and, no doubt, arose from his having been such a good lawyer-he
knew full well the difference between good lawyers who found
themselves in circumstances beyond their control, and lawyers
who created their own unfortunate circumstances. He may have
chided the good lawyer in a friendly way, but that lawyer never
suffered unnecessarily from the rocket docket.
From some quarters, and growing out of the emotion-filled
cases, particularly the desegregation cases, came the constant
drum beat that Judge Merhige considered himself a superlegislature, put in place to draft laws and rewrite the Constitution to suit his wishes. Those who said it were wrong, and did not
know him. His approach was to apply the law, not make it. He
was far too much of a disciple of the system to presume to make
things as he wanted them to be or thought they should be. It was
intuitive for him to apply this formula to decision making because
of the unique blend of personality traits he embodied.
His win-loss record, although not mentioned as his test for a
Judge's legacy, bears out the use of this approach to decision
making. I cannot give you his reversal percentage, but I can assure you that it was miniscule. Judges who go their own way
without adherence to the law do not have miniscule reversal records. Even his order providing for busing of Richmond students
into surrounding political subdivisions to do away with segregation, criticized for being "overreaching" and "way out of bounds,"
ended up in a four-to-four decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States, Justice Powell having recused himself because of
his service on the City of Richmond School Board. A four-to-four
decision is not synonymous with going one's own way, overreaching, or being way out of bounds.
This age old "making the law" criticism of judges always depends on the bias of the reporter. Ironically, while being accused
of drafting and rewriting the law in the 1970s, later in his career
there were those who accused Judge Merhige of not drafting or
rewriting enough. Taken in combination, the two contrary descriptions could be thought descriptive of a balanced, consistent
jurist striving to follow the law, not make it.
There are two other traits generally ascribed to judges considered to be good ones-bright and quick. He was overloaded with
both qualities, and if I need to give further examples of either,
then I have failed miserably in outlining the other traits which
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set in motion his judicial approach, and why he receives universal
acclaim as a judge.
There was a final trait, although not one of the personality variety, which he had to struggle with his entire judicial career. The
Judge always considered himself a lawyer, and often said so. This
is not a surprise considering what a good lawyer he was. In those
few cases where one of the lawyers, for whatever reason, was not
quite up to the task, he found it very difficult not to become the
lawyer for the disadvantaged client. The impulse was not driven
by his personal choice of sides, but rather a belief that the fight
should always be a fair one. He became quite adept at quietly
grinding his teeth as opposed to jumping in the fray, but never
lost the propensity to always hope that the fight was a fair one.
In short, Judge Merhige was one of a kind.

